



**DFID Consultation on the White Paper: Eliminating World Poverty.
Submission from the Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund (SCIAF) ⁱ.**

As the official overseas development agency of the Catholic Church in Scotland, SCIAF welcomes the chance to provide feedback for DFID’s third white paper ‘Eliminating World Poverty.’ Given the wide range of topics covered in the consultation exercise, SCIAF’s response is comprised of a general comment on the consultation document as a whole and specific answers to selected questions.

‘Eliminating World Poverty’: A General Comment.

Over the last 40 years SCIAF has worked with partner agencies in over 90 countries, from coffee growers in El Salvador to small-holders in India, from small-scale producers in Colombia to widows in Rwanda. In doing such work, SCIAF is inspired by the rich tradition of Catholic Social Teaching, rooted in the Bible and expanded upon by later documents such as the key encyclical *Populorum Progressio* (1967). This emphasises the inalienable dignity and inherent rights of each and every human being which leads us to espouse such notions as subsidiarity (decision-making at as small a level as possible and as big as necessary) and an active sense of solidarity with individuals and communities in the third world. It also means that ‘we are challenged to make an ‘option for the poor’—to speak for the voiceless, defend the defenceless, to assess lifestyles, policies in terms of their impact on the poor’ ⁱⁱ.

The perspective of the poor is thus at the heart of our work, and such breadth and depth of experience has convinced us that there is an intimate relationship between trade and development and that there are important debates to be had around the merits of free trade, ‘fair’ trade and the advantages and disadvantages they bring to specific regions, countries and groups within them.

In 2000, DFID’s predecessor White Paper *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor* recognised the significance of these issues, stating that ‘DFID continues to emphasise the importance of trade...in international development. Our aim is to...ensure that the development dimension is included in trade policy and similarly that trade policy is treated as an integral part of the development agenda ⁱⁱⁱ’. In 2004, the White Paper noted that ‘once the conditions are right, trade may often be the means by which growth takes place. The countries in which poverty has been reduced

have generally expanded their level of participation in world trade^{iv}.

In this regard, it is encouraging to note that DFID has a Department for International Trade--which 'work(s) with other government departments, developing and developed countries, international organisations and civil society to bring a development perspective into trade and integrate trade into development'^v--and that, since 1997, 'DFID has had more people dedicated to trade than any other bilateral donor.'

It is thus all the more surprising to find that trade issues are not given more attention either in Hilary Benn's speeches--where trade is mentioned only in passing--or in the consultation document as a whole, where there are few questions focusing on trade. It is difficult to talk of 'eliminating world poverty' without talking extensively on trade issues; something Hilary Benn has recognised—albeit briefly—in saying 'aid--in itself--is not enough... we have to tell the whole story about what makes development possible. Trade is a perfect example of that'^{vi}. In light of this, the remainder of SCIAF's submission will be concerned with those questions which have a trade component or with those questions that should have; namely 4) and 9).

‘Eliminating World Poverty’: Specific Answers to Specific Questions

4) How best can donors and developing countries increase access to basic services, such as health and education, in poor countries?

There is no easy answer or ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to increasing access to basic services. Even assuming that the necessary political will is there, the issues encountered—such as ensuring adequate financing and effective management—are complex, contested and differ from country to country. Whilst increased private sector participation may sometimes be part of the solution, it is seldom un-problematically or exclusively so. As such, a pre-requisite for increasing access is that developing countries with this political will have the policy space to choose for themselves—sector-by-sector and mode-by-mode—the extent of liberalisation and of private participation desired.

This key insight has been repeatedly espoused by the UK government; it was recognised by Labour in their Manifesto, by DFID in previous reports, by the Commission for Africa and by the G8 at Gleneagles. However, government policy often fails to match up to this rhetoric, as evidenced by the UK’s policy on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)—both the EU’s negotiating stance on this issue ^{vii} and the agreement it signed at Hong Kong ^{viii} (henceforth Annex C). Through its complicity in both of these, DFID has done little to increase access to public services whilst greatly facilitating market access for multinational companies through 1) aiding forced liberalisation and 2) decreasing developing countries policy space. SCIAF is deeply concerned that this is not a ‘preferential option for the poor.’ We are also concerned that it has negative consequences both in economic terms and in terms of democracy and accountability, moving further and further away from the ideal of subsidiarity.

To expand upon each of these points in turn, UK government policy has;

1) Aided forced liberalisation as Annex C’s stated aim is not to facilitate increased access to and availability of services but, rather, to facilitate a ‘progressively higher level of liberalisation of trade in services’ both bilaterally and plurilaterally. Indeed, the EU’s proposal openly talks of the need to create ‘new commercial opportunities’ and ‘effective market access,’ regardless of whether this is in the best interests of developing countries. However, SCIAF believes that liberalisation—in and of itself, and for liberalisation’s sake—should not be the guiding principle of trade negotiations. Instead, there should be widespread recognition that ‘freedom of trade is fair only if it is subject to the demands of social justice’ ^{ix}

- Bilaterally, Annex C intensifies the request and offer process, adopting the EU’s suggestion of guidelines that ‘new and improved offers’ should meet and by initiating a second round of revised offers in the face of continued opposition of many

developing countries reluctant to consider yet more liberalisation. As concerning as this is, it pales in comparison to what else the EU (and thus the UK) has been asking for, namely mandatory quantitative liberalisation commitments (which would force developing countries to make commitments in at least 93 sub-sectors) and qualitative parameters which would serve to increase the depth of such commitments. We would thus urge the UK government to consider whether these demands are compatible with its stance on forced liberalisation.

- Annex C also renews the emphasis on plurilateral negotiations which pit one or more developing countries against the collective might of developed countries (for e.g., the list of demandeurs for sectoral negotiations on environmental services includes Australia, Canada, the EC, Japan, Korea, Norway, Switzerland, Taiwan and the United States). The imbalances inherent within this approach should be a cause for concern for the UK. Of no less concern should be the EU's stated objective of making developing country participation in these negotiations mandatory, which would involve them having to offer sectors and modes up for liberalisation.

In light of such issues, the fact that the EU has excluded 'education, health services...(and) water for human use' from its plurilateral requests is welcome but does little to solve the underlying trend of pressure to liberalise. Not only is the exclusion of education and health rather vague--as it is not bound at WTO--but the exclusion of 'water for human used' is somewhat misleading. Water--given scarce attention in Hilary Benn's speeches--is not recognised as a service sub-sector in its own right. In fact, the UN classification system(s) used by GATS categorises water not as a service at all, but as a good. The myriad of different services involved in water provision therefore come under the bracket of sectors such as engineering and the environment, both of which are focuses for plurilateral negotiations. Thus although these sectors may be excluded for the time being, the clauses listed above make it all the more easy for the EU to push for liberalisation in such sectors at a later date.

Similarly, whilst the Commission's statement that it is 'not participating in any request...that could...impact on the operation of public services'^x is welcome, it also needs critical examination. In fact, GATS and the EU's stance within it restricts governments' policy space by:

- committing members to 'develop disciplines on domestic regulation' by the end of the round. Under this rubric, the UK government--as part of the EU--is pushing for the adoption of a 'necessity test' to ensure that the measures and regulations countries adopt are not 'more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service'^{xi}. This could have severe consequences for service provision--as what is a legitimate domestic regulation and what is an illegitimate market restriction is subject to much debate--and could thus limit government's ability to regulate and to protect its

citizens^{xii}.

- Refusing to critically examine GATS definition of a ‘governmental service’. Although they are, in theory, excluded from GATS, they are defined extremely narrowly as services that are provided neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with other suppliers. This unduly restrictive definition means that many legitimate government services would not be defined as such under GATS and would thus need to be GATS compliant.
- Doing nothing to temper, clarify or publicise existing GATS rules on national treatment that state countries have to accord foreign service providers ‘treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own like services and service suppliers’^{xiii} in all aspects of all service sectors, save those specifically exempt in their schedule. This will make it extremely difficult for governments to design and implement a whole raft of policy measures potentially useful in extending service provision such as:
 - Extending subsidies, preferential loans or loan guarantees to help national service providers or community owned/managed providers
 - Requiring foreign service providers to transfer technological and other skills (i.e. of various specialist competencies) to national providers, thus allowing them to increase the reach of services
 - Requiring that foreign service providers take local partners
- Doing nothing to temper, clarify or publicise existing GATS rules on market access that forbids not only discriminatory quantitative restrictions but virtually all quantitative restrictions whatsoever. The terms of the market access clause are such that, if fully applied, it does not matter whether quantitative measures are actually impeding market access for foreign firms or not. They may, in fact, impact equally on domestic and on foreign firms but will still be automatically prohibited unless the correct exemptions are detailed in a country's schedule. This makes it extremely difficult for governments to design and implement a whole raft of policy measures potentially useful in extending service provision such as:
 - Restrictions on the total number of services operations or the total quantity of service output. Policies designed to ensure equality of access—for example, by preventing service providers from delivering advanced water services to certain areas whilst other areas have none—are hence prohibited
 - ‘Restrict(ions) or require(ments) of specific types of legal entity or joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a service’. This clause is especially dangerous as, together with the national treatment clause, it has the potential to prevent any kind of preferential treatment to national companies or community-managed suppliers in the provision of water for human use.
 - Limitations on the percentage and/or on the total of foreign capital permitted in any service provider.^{xiv}

If DFID wishes to correct this and to work with those governments who have the political will to increase access to social services it should stop the EU from forcing developing countries to liberalise their service sectors by:

- Ensuring that the qualitative and quantitative guidelines for the bilateral request and offer process do not become mandatory as the EU is demanding
- Monitoring the EU's involvement in plurilateral agreements--and its lead on negotiations in the environmental and energy services--to ensure they are not used to pressurise developing countries into forced liberalisation
- Ensuring the new rules on domestic regulation do not inadvertently constrict policy space by adopting a broad definition of 'necessary' regulations
- Engender debate on the definition of 'governmental services'
- Emphasising countries rights to opt out of fully implementing the market access and national treatment clauses.
- Use the EU's position as lead on the plurilateral negotiations for environmental and energy services to ensure none of the UK/EU's requests inadvertently restrict access to services

These measures would go some way to increasing access to public services, but are not sufficient, especially in cases where the government lacks the necessary level of political will. In these instances, the issues of policy space, political ability and capacity outlined above are compounded by more fundamental problems at the national level and, as before, there exists no 'one-size-fits-all' solution. That said, the Church's history of engagement in a variety of countries has given it not only significant global reach—something facilitated by networks such as Caritas Internationalis and CIDSE—but a substantial presence at every level of society. As such, the Church often combines practical service provision at the grass-roots, parish level with access to, and influence over, key national and international decision makers through Bishop's Conferences. Thus the Church and other Christian based organisations (CBOs) are often uniquely placed to offer service provision in the short to medium term whilst empowering civil society to generate the political will in the long term.

Several examples from the work of SCIAF's partner agencies overseas serve to underscore this point. For example, after the RDC's annexation of East Congo, the Church played—and, pending the transfer of these duties to the government, continues to play—a crucial role in the provision of social services, running 16 hospitals and helping to deliver education services, including university education. The Church has played a similar role in Northern Uganda, bringing the rebels and local communities together in order to facilitate negotiations and providing key social services, including;

- Various services to aid the rehabilitation of child soldiers (e.g. substance abuse treatment, counselling)

- Various security/human rights services (e.g. providing overnight shelter/protection for children)
- HIV/AIDS services (AIDS awareness, AIDS family support)

The Church is also providing key HIV/AIDS services elsewhere. For example, in Arusha, Tanzania, the Archdiocese is conducting work at the grass-roots level to reduce the stigma of the disease, to help affected individuals and groups (such as the Masai) meet their everyday needs and to promote community based health care. Moreover, this practical work is also supplemented by advocacy initiatives, targeting local politicians and national government to provide better services for HIV/AIDS sufferers.

Finally, in El Salvador and Nicaragua, Jesuit organisations have been able to play a crucial role in providing:

- Access to water; providing wells, water tanks and advocating for more investment to improve sanitation
- Housing; both governments lack proper structures to help communities rebuild after emergencies and natural disasters. CBOs have stepped into the void and are trusted to help families rebuild their houses and means of income generation (i.e. small-scale farming).
- Education; there is insufficient primary school education for children and no support for adults to access even the most basic levels of education. The Jesuits have helped by providing basic materials (e.g. books), school meals and training for teachers.

Taken together, then, these case studies reveal that CBOs are already helping to increase access to social services especially—but not exclusively—in cases where the government is unwilling to provide it. This fact—historically understated both by national planning systems and by international donors alike—is now starting to be better appreciated. In this vein, SCIAF welcomes Hilary Benn’s recognition that:

the churches’ international reach, long-term perspective and concern about social justice and development issues make you a natural partner for government. In developed and developing countries alike, you have the ear of governments and the trust of society. As the oldest multinational in the world you are able to transcend national interests and boundaries in a way most democratic Governments find near impossible^{xv}.

We would thus urge DFID to support the work of FBOs in service provision both at the international level (e.g. through increased funding) and, where appropriate, at the national level (e.g. ensuring their work is recognised by and incorporated into national plans for service delivery).

These measures, if combined with positive action around GATS, will make an important contribution in increasing access to social services both in countries where the political will exists and in countries where it does not.

9) How can the UK Government make sure that international trade negotiations deliver the benefits needed for developing countries? How can trade barriers be broken down so that developing countries get better access to regional and international markets?

There are a wide range of approaches the UK government could adopt to extend the benefits of trade to developing countries and an almost equivalent range of international trade negotiations--bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral--with which to apply such approaches. However, as DFID's 'strongest focus is on the multilateral trading system, especially the Doha Development Agenda,'^{xvi} it is with this that SCIAF's submission is concerned.

SCIAF starts from the key insight found in *Populorum Progressio* that 'in order that international trade be human and moral, social justice requires that it restore to the participants a certain equality of opportunity. This equality is a long term objective, but to reach it, we must begin now to create true equality in discussions and negotiations'^{xvii}. The question then becomes how best to ensure this 'equality of opportunity,' with much recent research identifying that removing barriers to market access is necessary but ultimately insufficient. If developing countries are to benefit from negotiations and are to compete on an equal footing, it is clear that supply side constraints must also be overcome, both by increasing the capacity of developing country producers and decreasing internal barriers to trade (e.g. insufficient infrastructure, complex customs procedures).

DFID has made some important steps in this regard, not least its commitment to spend £181 million on trade-related development assistance between 1998-2008 and its contribution of £350 thousand towards 'Aid-For-Trade' at the WTO^{xviii}. However, SCIAF is concerned that 'aid-for-trade' is not properly defined in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. Aid for trade will only be welcomed if it is aid to increase trade through capacity building, not if it is aid to compensate for--and to facilitate acceptance of-- the rapid trade liberalisation that the EU and the UK is demanding. Before committing any more money, DFID should use the EU's position as one of 13 members on the Aid-for-Trade working group to clarify this and to make sure that:

- Aid for trade is in addition to, and not taken out of, aid that has already been promised
- Such aid is given as grants, not as loans, even if—as the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration suggests—they are on 'concessional' terms.
- Developed countries support for, and input into, any aid-for-trade programme is predictable, bound and that compliance is enforceable through the WTO's dispute settlement mechanisms.
- There is adequate country ownership. After all, as the last White Paper (2004) recognised, 'the fact that most developing countries face severe supply side

constraints...points to the need to remove trade barriers in a way that is properly sequenced and, vitally, within a broader plan for development and poverty reduction'^{xix}.

Finally, a focus on supply side constraints should not have the effect (intended or otherwise) of detracting from market access concerns. Supply side constraints do hinder developing countries' ability to access international markets, but so too do tariffs, non-tariff barriers, domestic and export subsidies used by the EU. For example, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad and Benin—all extremely efficient producers of high quality cotton which, by the WTO's own admission, have undertaken 'domestic reform efforts...aimed at (further) enhancing productivity and efficiency'—are nonetheless unable to make significant inroads into international markets due to comparable actions by the US^{xx}.

Thus if the UK government is genuinely interested in delivering the benefits of trade negotiations to developing countries--and in having a 'EU position (that) take(s) account of development perspectives'^{xxi}--it should try to use its influence within the 133 Committee in the following ways.

| In Agriculture, DFID should:

- Build upon the commitment to special products and the special safeguard mechanism made at Hong Kong and continue to make sure that this commitment is implemented fully and enshrined in practice as well as in theory. For example, DFID could help build support for the G33's request that 20% of tariff lines are allowed to claim 'special product' status and could endeavour to ensure that the trigger level(s) set for the special safeguard mechanism is one that is operationally effective. This has the potential to make a real difference to communities in many countries where SCIAF works--be it smallholders trying to make a living from growing rice or potatoes in Colombia or coffee growers in El Salvador—who have all suffered from floods of artificially cheap imports.
- Mitigate against the attitude evidenced by France and 11 other countries in a recent memo to the EU^{xxii} which stated that 'the number and treatment of sensitive products contained in this proposals...cannot under any circumstances be reduced.' As many sensitive products are the very ones in which developing countries have a comparative advantage, the very concept contradicts DFID and DTI's Public Service Agreement target—namely, to 'ensure the EU secures significant reductions in EU and world trade barriers...leading to improved opportunities for developing countries'—and, in any case, such a blanket refusal to negotiate hardly bodes well for success in the Doha Round.
- Mitigate against the attitude, displayed in the aforementioned memo, that 'the 28

October 2005 proposal exhausted — perhaps exceeded — all the room for manoeuvre we had...on market access and domestic support.’

- Ideally try to build support for a deeper, ‘real’ reduction in amber box subsidies as the EC’s offer does not impact upon applied rates.
- Perhaps more realistically, push for effective ‘additional disciplines’ on the blue box and try to ensure that the review of the Green Box is a genuine, extensive exercise. Yet again, this will involve countering the view of France et al that the Green Box review ‘will need to ensure that the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of this box remain’.

In the area of industry or non-agricultural market access (NAMA), DFID should:

- Assert the validity of balanced market access in NAMA and in agriculture as a means of ensuring developing countries are not forced to give more in industrial market access than they receive back in agricultural liberalisation. This principle—enshrined in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration—has nevertheless been challenged in the recent French memo which stated that ‘any comparison between agriculture and NAMA is by its very nature biased.’ If DFID is serious about making trade negotiations work for the poor, it should be serious about defending this principle in the face of concerted opposition.
- As part of the overall ‘give-and-take’ of negotiations, work to modify the EC’s demands on NAMA. For example, the EU is asking that developing countries permanently cap at least 90% of their tariffs at 10%, even though the developing country industrial tariffs average at 30%--a proposal which, according to the G90, would ‘further deepen the crisis of de-industrialisation and accentuate the unemployment and poverty crisis in our countries’^{xxiii}. The UK should ideally espouse the advantages of the more flexible formula proposed by Argentina, Brazil and India or, more realistically, work towards accepting a ‘dual coefficient’ with one cap for developed countries and another for developing countries.

The above changes would go a long way to ensure that developing countries benefit from trade liberalisation; but the negotiating positions of developed members such as the EU is only half of the story. It is also important to enable developing countries--many of whom face severe resource and knowledge constraints--to actively and credibly participate in the ongoing negotiations at the WTO. Indeed, as Pope Paul IV noted, ‘if the positions of the contracting parties are too unequal, the consent of the parties does not suffice to guarantee the justice of their contract, and the rule of free agreement remains subservient to the demands of the natural law’^{xxiv}.

An important first step in achieving this would be for the UK to influence the EU to drop the contentious issue of ‘advanced developing countries.’ Not only is it extremely

divisive, it is also unfair and inaccurate—India, for example, being ‘home to one in three of the poorest people in the world’^{xxv}—as well as counter-productive. Even if some developing countries are more ‘advanced’ than others, there is no better way to retard their developmental progress--and to depress them back to the level of ‘normal’ developing countries--than by forcing progressively higher rates of liberalisation upon them. In terms of positive measures to be taken, DFID should build upon the valuable work it has already been doing--work such as supporting the South Centre, ICTSD and contributing to the Advisory Centre on WTO Law--whilst helping to improve the quality of technical support and advice provided by the WTO Secretariat, widely perceived to be biased. For example, the UK government should push for the studies into the potential impacts of service liberalisation that developing countries were promised in 1994 to help them prepare for the GATS negotiations.

Whilst it is clear, then, that there much scope for improvement within the WTO framework as it currently stands, ultimately the institutional framework itself also needs to be modified if developing countries are to fully participate in and benefit from trade negotiations. DFID should thus support the creation of a working group with a mandate to:

- invite members to submit responses on the various Advisory/Consultative Group/Body options already tabled
- table additional proposals
- Present an unprejudiced report and strategy for moving forward^{xxvi}.

In such ways can DFID help to ensure that developing countries benefit from multilateral trade negotiations. Moreover, these recommendations--considered in conjunction with the other points made in this submission-- should go some way towards ensuring that trade policy is, indeed, ‘treated as an integral part of the development agenda.’

ⁱ Any further comments/questions should be addressed to adymond@sciaf.org.uk

ⁱⁱ Quote taken from <http://www.thesocialagenda.org/>

ⁱⁱⁱ DFID (2000) *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor*" White Paper on International Development - Chapter 5, para 5.3-5.

^{iv} DTI (2004) *Making Globalisation a Force for Good*, Trade and Investment White Paper p78

^v As quoted online at www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/intertradedept.asp

^{vi} Benn, H (2006) *Fifth White Paper Speech: Development Beyond Aid* Speech given at Chatham House, February 23rd. Accessable online at <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/Speeches/wp2006-speeches/beyond-aid230206.asp>

^{vii} Taken from the EC’s last formal statement of its negotiating position--EC (2005) *Communication from the European Commission and its Member States: Elements for Complementary Approaches in Services* Document submitted to the WTO’s Council for Trade in Services Special Session on October 27th. Document number TN/S/W/55--combined with Mandelsohn’s speeches, press releases and the content of plurilateral requests thereafter.

^{viii} Annex C of WTO (2005) Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, henceforth referred to as Annex C.

^{ix} *Populorum Progressio*, 59

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- ^x European Commission (2006) EU and Others Launch Plurilateral Process to boost Doha Services Negotiations Press Release dated 28th February; Brussels.
- ^{xi} Article VI in the original (1994) GATS text.
- ^{xii} Scott Sinclair (2005) *Domestic Regulation: Proposed GATS Restrictions threaten vital regulatory services* Paper given to SCIAF Policy Analyst at the WTO Ministerial.
- ^{xiii} Sinclair, S (2005) *The GATS, South African Local Governments and Water Services* Briefing Paper, Trade and Investment Series. Volume 6, no 2. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Ottawa p3
- ^{xiv} Article XVI in the original (1994) GATS text.
- ^{xv} Benn, H (2004) Speech to the Churches World Development Network “Does Campaigning Work” Conference, June 9
- ^{xvi} DFID (2005) *DFID’s Work on International Trade and Development 2005-7* p5
- ^{xvii} Available from <http://www.thesocialagenda.org/>
- ^{xviii} DFID (2005) *DFID’s Work on International Trade and Development 2005-7* p5
- ^{xix} DTI (2004) *Making Globalisation a Force for Good*, Trade and Investment White Paper p78
- ^{xx} Much information in this section influenced by Stiglitz, J E and Charlton, A (2006) *Working Papers. Aid for Trade: A Report for the Commonwealth Secretariat* Accessable online at <http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/programs/item.cfm?ptid=2&prid=24&iyid=13&itid=815>
- ^{xxi} DTI (2004) *Making Globalisation a Force for Good*, Trade and Investment White Paper p78
- ^{xxii} Memorandum submitted by the agricultural ministers of France and 11-14 other countries. Available online at: <http://www.ourworldisnotforsale.org/showarticle.asp?search=1361>
- ^{xxiii} G90 response to the Derbez Text as quoted in Bridges. www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-0714/BRIDGESWeekly8-25.pdf
- ^{xxiv} *Populorum Progressio*, 59
- ^{xxv} DFID – Department for International Development (2004) *Partnership for Development: India Country Assistance Plan*, London: DFID
- ^{xxvi} Taken from CIDSE/Caritas Internationalis Position Paper (2005) *A hearing at the WTO for all Members: Guidelines for improving the WTO negotiating process* Available online at <http://www.cidse.org/docs/200505261417146741.pdf>